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 Devolving Abortion Law 
 
 
The power to legislate in relation to abortion was devolved to the Scottish Parliament under 
section 53 of the Scotland Act 2016 ³6$´, which deletes section J1 from part 2 of 
Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 ³6$´. This article briefly describes the existing 
legal context against which the transfer of power takes place, discusses some of the issues 
associated with exercising the power, and reflects upon assurances that there are no plans to 





During the Smith Commission negotiations, the proposed devolution of abortion enjoyed 
support from the Green Party, the Scottish National Party, the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats.1 Labour negotiators strongly opposed it, however, and reportedly made the 
reservation of abortion a ³red line issue´ ± a non-negotiable condition of their agreement to 
any package.2 The case for devolving abortion was quite compelling: the relevant portfolios, 
health and criminal justice, were already within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament, 
and the parliament already had power over other highly controversial matters (for example, it 
has debated assisted suicide several times in recent years). The Labour Party¶VRSSRVLWLRQZDV
apparently motivated by fear that the democratic process in Scotland may yield a less liberal 
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 approach to abortion than that currently allowed for by the Abortion Act 1967 (³the 1967 
Act´), which applies throughout Scotland, England, and Wales.3 Because of Labour 
opposition, the 6PLWK &RPPLVVLRQ¶V final report4 did not recommend the devolution of 
abortion, and it was not included in the initial version of the Scotland Bill. Nevertheless, the 
Scottish Secretary later announced to the Scottish Affairs Committee at Westminster that the 
UK government had decided to amend the Bill to include abortion, on the basis that there was 
³no convincing constitutional reason´ for continuing to reserve it.5 The Scottish Government, 
while welcoming the decision, immediately announced that it had no plans to change the law 
in the area, no doubt keen to avoid the unedifying and divisive experience of a public 
abortion debate in Scotland.6 
 
 
B. THE EXISTING LAW 
 
In Scotland, as in England and Wales, abortion is governed by the 1967 Act as amended by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (³WKH$FW´). Section 1(1) of the 1967 
Act provides that: 
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 «a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a 
pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical 
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith²  
(a)  that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of 
the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of 
her family; or  
(b)  that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman; or  
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or  
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
 
 
The selective decriminalisation effected by the 1967 Act notwithstanding, abortion remains a 
prima facie crime throughout Great Britain. Any induced abortion that did not comply with 
the conditions set out in the 1967 Act would be dealt with under the pre-1967 law, which is 
different in Scotland than in England and Wales. In England and Wales, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, abortion could result in a charge under section 58 (if performed by 
the woman herself) or section 59 (if performed by a third party) of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 ³WKH$FW´), which makes it an offence to procure a miscarriage and 
carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. If the foetus was ³capable of being born 
alive´,7 the alternative charge of ³child destruction´ (which carries the same penalty) would 
be available under section 1 of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 (³the 1929 Act´). In 
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 Scotland, someone who induced a miscarriage could (again depending on the circumstances) 
be charged with the common law crime of procuring an abortion.8 
Before 1967, defences to a charge of abortion/procuring a miscarriage were available in 
both jurisdictions. In the cases of R v Collins9 and R v H Windsor Bell 10 the English courts 
had appeared to accept that there would be a defence to a charge under the 1861 Act if the 
abortion had been performed to save the life of the pregnant woman. The 1929 Act enshrined 
this defence in statute, section 1(1) providing WKDW ³QR SHUVRQ VKDOO EH IRXQG JXLOW\ RI DQ
offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child 
ZDVQRWGRQH LQJRRG IDLWK IRU WKHSXUSRVHRQO\ RISUHVHUYLQJ WKH OLIHRI WKHPRWKHU´7KH
case of R v Bourne11 extended the defence to cover abortion performed to avoid danger to 
health as well as to life, since Macnaghten J was unconvinced that a ³perfectly clear line of 
distinction´ could be drawn between them.12 
In contrast with (QJODQGDV1RUULHKDVQRWHG³the Scots common law seems always to 
have recognised that not all induced abortions are criminal.´13 He explains:14 
 
 Scots criminal law has a quite different theoretical foundation to English criminal law, being 
 EDVHGSULPDULO\RQWKHZLFNHGQHVVRIWKHDFFXVHG¶VLQWHQWDQGVRZDVDEOHWRUHFRJQLVHPXFK
 more easily than English law that a doctor performing an abortion for therapeutic reasons 
 does not have wicked and felonious intent, and is therefore not acting criminally«Though 
 Gordon describes the  therapeutic exception to the crime of procuring abortion as ³ill-
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  defined´, it was nevertheless well-settled, and Mason and McCall-Smith are 
 undoubtedly correct in pointing out that Mr Bourne, the surgeon who instigated his 
 own prosecution in order to determine the limits of therapeutic abortion in  English 
 law, would not have been charged had he carried out his abortion in Scotland, there 
 clearly being no wicked and felonious intent on his part.15 
 
In Scotland, then, it seems that prior to 1967, abortion was lawful at common law up until 
birth provided that there was no wicked LQWHQW DQG WKDWGHPRQVWUDWLQJ ³therapeutic intent´ 
(life-saving or otherwise) would be one way of establishing lawfulness. After Bourne, 
therefore, it might be said that Scots and English law had arrived at roughly the same place 
via different routes,16 at least as far as non-viable foetuses and embryos were concerned: it 
was lawful in both jurisdictions to abort them in order to avoid danger to the ZRPDQ¶V life or 
health.  
In relation to viable foetuses, however, the jurisdictions differed considerably. Scots 
law made no special provision in relation to late-term foetuses, meaning that they too could 
be aborted lawfully as long as there was no wicked intent. By contrast, under the 1929 Act in 
England and WalesWKHDERUWLRQRID³child capable of being born alive´ (a capacity which 
was presumed at twenty-HLJKWZHHNV¶JHVWDWLRQDODJH)17 was lawful only if performed to save 
the ZRPDQ¶V life. Therapeutic intent other than the intent to save life was insufficient to 
render lawful the abortion of a late-term foetus. 
The coming into force of the 1967 Act did not immediately create consistency across 
the jurisdictions, since the original Act made no explicit provision for time limits and relied 
instead on the twenty-eight week presumption enshrined in section 1(2) of the 1929 Act 
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 (which did not extend to Scotland). The effect was that abortion under the grounds set out in 
the 1967 Act was subject to a twenty-eight week upper limit in England and Wales, but was 
available in Scotland without limit of time (just as there had been no time limit under the pre-
existing Scots common law). Only when the 1990 Act amended the 1967 Act to uncouple it 
from the twenty-eight week presumption in the 1929 Act,18 and apply explicit time limits of 
twenty-four weeks to two of the grounds (those concerning risk to the health of the women or 
her existing children), did the same rules eventually apply on both sides of the border. 
 
 
C. NO PLANS FOR CHANGE? 
 
Few issues are capable of generating as much rancour and division as abortion. The last time 
arguments about abortion dominated public debate in Britain was during the late 1980s, 
leading up to the enactment of the 1990 Act. Since then, although a few SULYDWHPHPEHUV¶
Bills and tabled amendments in Westminster have sought to address isolated aspects of the 
legislative framework (seeking, for example, to lower the time limit from twenty-four weeks, 
or to clarify that abortion purely on grounds of foetal sex would be unlawful), these have all 
been unsuccessful.  
Pro-choice campaigners are pressing for change on both sides of the border, however. 
The British Pregnancy Advisory Service (³BPAS´FDPSDLJQ³We Trust Women´ seeks the 
complete decriminalisation of abortion, arguing (inter alia) that the penalties attached to the 
crimes of abortion and child destruction in the 1861 and 1929 Acts are too harsh; that the 
requirement for two doctorV¶ DXWKRULVDWLRQ LV XQQHFHVVDU\ and that the legal framework 
governing abortion in Britain reflects outdated attitudes to abortion and to women.19 The 
campaign is highly controversial, since decriminalisation would mean the removal of time 
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 limits and statutory conscience rights as well as the sanctions for unlawful abortion; it would 
amount to RIILFLDODFFHSWDQFHRI³DERUWLRQRQGHPDQG´ Although the campaign was formally 
launched on 9 February 2016, BPAS has been arguing for complete decriminalisation at least 
since June 2014.20 Upon the news that abortion lawmaking powers would be devolved, BPAS 
XUJHG6FRWODQGWR³lead the way´ in effecting decriminalisation.21 
In England, since the relevant crimes are contained in the 1861 and 1929 Acts, repeal of 
the relevant provisions would remove the crimes completely (and the 1967 Act would 
become meaningless in their absence). In Scotland, by contrast, since procuring abortion is a 
common law crime unless there is a lack of wicked intent, ³FRPSOHWH decriminalisation´ 
would require the overturning of the common law position. The repeal of the 1967 Act would 
simply place Scotland back in its pre-1967 position, under which abortion is a prima facie 
crime and an absence of wicked intent would require to be established on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, whereas decriminalisation in England and Wales would involve a process of 
repeal, complete decriminalisation in Scotland would mean enacting new law to clarify that 
abortion was not a crime. 
Experience at Westminster teaches us that the introduction of any legislation which 
even touches on the issue of abortion will be a fraught, polarising and protracted process. As 
BPAS themselves have previously acknowledged:22 
 
Since 1990, when the abortion law was last amended, governments and their civil servants have 
GRQH WKHLU EHVW WR NHHS DERUWLRQ RXW RI 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ SROLWLFV ,W¶V HDV\ WR XQGHUVWDQG ZK\
Abortion is a complex and polarising topic, which confers political advantage on no party. 
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 $ERUWLRQLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWSROLF\PDNHUVOLNHPRVWSHRSOHDFFHSWEXWGRQ¶WZDQWWRWDONDERXW
And the way in which the Abortion Act was drafted has allowed services to develop as society 
has needed them. 
 
It is understandable that the Scottish government would also like to avoid debating abortion. 
If the UK Parliament were to change the law in England and Wales in a way that altered or 
repealed the 1967 Act, however (either in response to the BPAS campaign or for any other 
reason), the devolved institutions would, as a matter of practical necessity, need to decide 
whether any changes ought to apply in Scotland as well, or whether the existing law should 
continue in force (the latter would be the default position). Intense lobbying would naturally 
ensue from those on both sides of the debate who would like to see changes to the current 
law. Depending upon the scale of any change south of the border, the Scottish Parliament 
could foreseeably find itself building abortion law in Scotland from the ground up, debating a 
range of highly flammable issues such as time limits, sex selective abortion, abortion on 
grounds of disability, and statutory rights of conscience for health care professionals. In 
relation to the latter, the fact that regulation of the health professions is still reserved to 
Westminster23 may present an irksome, though not unsurmountable, complication. In any 
case, it is far from inconceivable that one or more of these issues could end up on the agenda 





It should be acknowledged that as things stand there is no evidence of either government 
being receptive to demands for decriminalisation, and in the aftermath oIWKH³%UH[LW´ vote on 
23 June 2016, it seems very unlikely that either parliament will have time in the near future to 
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 become embroiled in debating abortion. Once the post-Brexit constitutional activity 
eventually subsides, however, campaigners will undoubtedly seek to place abortion back on 
the political agenda. 
Section 53 of SA 2016 notwithstanding, there is an important sense in which, politically 
if not legally speaking, Scotland remains at the mercy of Westminster where abortion is 
concerned. Although the UK Parliament can no longer make abortion law for Scotland 
directly, it could, if it disturbs the 1967 Act, create considerable political pressure forcing 
Holyrood to confront the issue. Scotland is a relatively small polity in which strong views can 
EHFRPHKHLJKWHQHGDQG LQWHUHVWJURXSV¶LQIluence magnified. Moreover, it currently faces a 
period of constitutional uncertainty of unknown duration: there will be plenty of tests of 
6FRWODQG¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV and social solidarity in the coming months and years. There is 
probably no good time for an abortion debate; arguably, however, there are times when one 
would be particularly unwise. Nevertheless, the main parties in Scotland have a duty to make 
their positions on abortion clear to the Scottish electorate, given that they may be unable to 
control whether and when the issue arrives at Holyrood. 
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